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The religious philosophy o f the Kyoto School, including that o f Nishi­tani Keiji, has often been discussed in terms o f the influence o f and its response to Western philosophers such as William James, Nietzsche, and 
Heidegger, or Christian mystics such as Eckhart. But how does the thought of 
Nishitani Keiji relate to traditional Mahayana Buddhist thought? Does 
Nishitani represent classical Buddhist ideas? Should he? In creatively rethink­
ing both the Buddhist and Western tradition to apply them to problems o f our 
age, one should expect some radical and challenging rethinking o f both tradi­
tions. On the other hand, there are people who are not happy to have the 
Kyoto School touted as representing Buddhism to the West. The writings of 
the Kyoto School philosophers are not widely read by traditional Buddhist 
and sectarian scholars (both Japanese and Western). Some even say that they 
are “ not Buddhist.”  Whether for good or ill, how far does the Kyoto School 
and Nishitani ‘ ‘depart” from the bounds o f classical Buddhist thought? One 
o f the contributions o f the philosophers o f the Kyoto School in their attempt 
to re-present Buddhist thought in the modem philosophical arena is to 
introduce the phrase “ absolute nothingness” (zettai mu But what is
the significance o f this phrase, and how does it relate to classical Buddhist for­
mulations? In this essay I wish to focus on a specific and narrow theme: to 
examine Nishitani *s discussion o f absolute nothingness and emptiness from 
the perspective o f a fundamental principle o f traditional East Asian Bud­
dhism, that is, the T’ien-t’ai concept of the threefold truth.
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THE T ’lEN-T’AI THREEFOLD TRUTH 
AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM
The T’ien-t’ai concept of the threefold truth—emptiness, the conventional, 
and the middle—was developed by Chih-i (538-597) as an expression of the 
basic structure of Mahayana Buddhist thought and practice. It developed 
specifically in the context of the two-truths controversy in China; a debate con­
cerning the classical Buddhist idea of the mundane “ worldly”  truth (sarpvrti- 
satya) and the “ real, ultimate” truth (paramdrtha-satyd). The issue remained 
unresolved and had reached a dead end because it had been couched in terms 
of the ambiguous, dualistic, and misleading terminology of being (yu  W) and 
nothingness (wu & ). The worldly truth was identified with and explained in 
terms of “ being” , and the ultimate truth was identified and explained in terms 
of “ nothingness.” 1 However, this formulation could not get beyond the 
dichotomy of being and nothingness, nor fully express the Buddhist teachings. 
Chih-i’s threefold truth broke through this impasse by discussing the issue in 
terms of emptiness, the conventional, and the middle. Later, for historical 
reasons that cannot be explored here but do require further clarification, the 
Ch’an (Zen) tradition reverted to a frequent use of wu/mu (nothingness) 
rhetoric, and this has strongly colored the modem understanding of East 
Asian Buddhism.2
1 For details see my analysis in Foundations o f  T*ien-t*ai Philosophy: The Flower­
ing o f  the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism (Berkeley: Asian Humanities 
Press, 1989).
2 For example, in the oft-quoted article “ The Characteristics o f  Oriental Nothing­
ness,'* the Zen scholar/master Hisamatsu Shin'ichi gives several possible meanings of 
the term “ nothingness" and proffers an “ Oriental Nothingness" (caps in the original) 
based for the most part on the A wakening o f  Faith t the Platform  Sutra, and other Zen 
sources. However, his attempt to define an “ Oriental Nothingness" (in contrast to, 
perhaps, an Occidental Somethingness?), is dated and opaque. As we shall see in the 
few short pages o f my essay, the classical T ’ien-t’ai threefold truth, Zen mu rhetoric, 
and Nishitani's absolute nothingness are each distinct (though related) formulations o f 
“ nothingness" and do not rely on some vague, underlying notion o f  Oriental Nothing­
ness. There is no single definable and consistent Oriental Nothingness, just as there is 
no single definable and consistent notion o f  “ being" in the Western tradition.
The locus classicus for the formulation of the threefold truth by Chih-i is 
from the Chinese verse translation of MQlamadhyamaka-karika of NagSrju- 
na, chapter 24:18 (T 30.33b):
The co-arising of all things
I call emptiness ??.
Or, [I call it] a conventional designation
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Or again, this is the meaning of the Middle Way
Thus, reality is a single unity with three aspects: The first, emptiness, refers 
to absence of substantial being. The second, conventional reality, refers to 
the provisional or temporal existence of the phenomenal world which is co­
arising. Finally, the Middle Way is a simultaneous affirmation of both.
For Chih-i, these three aspects are not separate, but integral parts of a 
unified reality. They are not separate realities in contrast with each other, but 
simultaneous and inclusive o f each other. The world we experience is empty of 
an eternal, unchanging substance, and yet at the same time the objects of our 
experience have a temporary or conventional reality. Lest we lapse into the 
mistake of nihilism or substantivism, we need a Middle Way: to affirm the 
simultaneous emptiness of phenomena along with their temporal or conven­
tional reality. This Middle Way, however, must not be grasped as an eternal, 
transcendental Reality; it is, rather, manifested in and through temporal, 
phenomenal reality, which is again in turn empty of an unchanging substance. 
The circle is complete: a perfectly integrated threefold truth.
To put it another way, “ being”  is mistakenly understood if taken as sub­
stantially existing, but if understood correctly, phenomena are seen as existing 
“ conventionally.”  “ Nothingness,”  on the other hand, is mistakenly under­
stood if it is nihilistically taken as a complete denial of all existence, but if un­
derstood correctly, phenomena are seen as “ empty” of substantial existence. 
Thus, both sides are expressions of the same idea, like two sides of a coin. 
This is the Middle: the simultaneous realization of the emptiness of phenome­
na that have temporal, conventional reality.
This is the classic T ’ien-t’ai formulation of the threefold truth, but it is also 
more than just one sectarian interpretation. It is a basic pattern that incor­
porates both the negative and the positive, and which provides not only a 
basic structure for Buddhist thought but also for Buddhist practice. Thus one 
cultivates Buddhist practice to “ empty”  oneself of delusions and passionate 
afflictions, and to “ gain” insight and compassion. One not only aims to attain 
wisdom for oneself, but to act compassionately for the sake of others. 
“ Being”  and “ nothingness”  are seen as mistaken extremes to be avoided. 
Such ideals are not limited to the T’ien-t’ai school, but are basic to Mahayana 
Buddhism in general.
Recently I was pleased to find that this threefold truth formulation was uti­
lized in an editorial in the Buddhist newspaper ChQgai N ippO  to buttress their
’ See the translation in “ Aum Alone in Japan: Religious Responses to the Aum 
Affair”  by Robert Kisala in Bulletin o f  the Nanzan Institute f o r  Religion and Culture 
19 (1995), pp. 12-14.
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argument that Aum ShinrikyO—the group accused of planting poison gas on 
the Tokyo subways and which claims to be Buddhist—is not Buddhism. This 
editorial shows that the threefold truth formulation is not just a dead classical 
principle, but a position accepted by the Buddhist “ establishment” as 
authoritative in their own self-understanding, and as a teaching that can be 
used as a measure for rejecting some other teaching (specifically that o f Aum 
Shinrikyd) as "non-Buddhist.” Let us look at some excerpts from this editori­
al, not only to illustrate a contemporary application but also to flesh out the 
implications of the threefold truth formulation:
Anybody with even a slight knowledge of Buddhism cannot possibly 
believe that these people [Aum followers] are Buddhists. . . . 
Buddhism is characterized by the principle of the Middle Way. . . .
The Buddhist Middle Way found two classical expressions: the 
middle way between joy and sorrow of early Buddhism, and in 
Mahayana the middle way of the three truths of the empty, 
provisional, and middle. The former avoids extreme hedonism and 
asceticism and maintains that the true spiritual path and the true way 
of life lie in the middle of these two. Hedonism means dissipation in 
following one’s passions. Asceticism means the suppression of the 
instinct for life preservation and the infliction of suffering on one’s 
body. . . .
The Middle Way of the Three Truths of the Lotus SQtra maintains 
that both the emptiness doctrine of the Hlnayana and the doctrine of 
the provisional of the Mahayana are uptiya, and that truth lies in a 
middle way that knows how to synthesize both without being caught 
by either. The emptiness vision teaches impermanence and egoless­
ness with a view to eradicating the passions. This doctrine is said to 
be propounded as an upaya for the overcoming of egoism and the 
betterment of a secular world suffering from the struggles provoked 
by that egoism. The doctrine of the provisional, on the other hand, 
teaches that this world exists as a totality wherein everything is 
mutually dependent and that all things exist within a life project that 
is embraced by the Buddha’s mercy. Beings participate in this proj­
ect, and all must live a life of merciful acts. That is the bodhisattva 
path of Mah&yAna. . . .
However, emptiness and the provisional [in themselves] are both 
partial truths that must be synthesized. The synthesis is the Middle 
Way of the Lotus Sutra. Both emptiness (a monasticism that negates 
the passions) and the provisional (a lay ideal that reveres life) are 
standpoints that approach two sides of the truth. The Middle Way
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consists in realizing a higher holistic value by synthesizing these two, 
and thereby pursuing the happiness of humankind. . . .
In order to be called Buddhist, one must follow the Middle Way 
on the basis of a vision of a world of dependent origination. . .
This editorial is an interesting mix of classical teaching and modem expres­
sion, showing that the threefold truth is not just classic but still very much 
current. In a sense it is a contemporary application of classical “ truths”  analo­
gous to the attempt by Kyoto School philosophers to reinterpret Buddhist 
teachings in the context of modem philosophy by introducing terms such as 
“ absolute nothingness.”  With this in mind, let us now take a look at 
Nishitani’s thought—in particular his use of the terms “ absolute nothing­
ness”  and “ emptiness” —and see how it compares to this classic Buddhist for­
mulation of the threefold truth.
NISHITANI. ABSOLUTE NOTHINGNESS, AND EMPTINESS
The use of the term “ absolute nothingness”  is one of the defining features of 
the Kyoto School: as Nishitani points out, “ the philosophies [of Nishida 
KitarO and Tanabe Hajime] share a distinctive and common basis that sets 
them apart from traditional Western philosophy: absolute nothingness.” 4 
Nishitani himself is no exception, and the English translators did him a service 
in retitling his book Religion and Nothingness.5 A close inspection of 
Nishitani’s discussion, however, reveals that the apparently negative term 
“ absolute nothingness”  refers to much the same as what is meant in classical 
Mahayana Buddhism by the terms “ emptiness”  and the “ middle,”  as well as 
comparable ideas from the Christian mystic tradition.6 For example, in 
Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani is at pains to point out that “ This 
emptiness, or lilnyata, is another thing altogether from the nihility of 
nihilism”  (p. 95), and that
4 See Nishitani’s essay on “The Philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe” in Nishida 
KitarO (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 161.
5 The original Japanese title was ShakyO to wa nani ka [What is Religion?], but 
when the book was translated into English it was felt that “ religion and nothingness” 
more accurately reflected the contents and was a “ more suitable alternative” (see trans­
lator’s introduction, p. xlii). Page numbers after quotes from Nishitani refer to this 
text unless indicated otherwise.
6 Nishitani points out, for example, that “Absolute nothingness signals, for 
Eckhart, the point at which all modes o f being are transcended, at which not only the 
various modes of created being but even the modes o f divine being—such as Creator or 
Divine Love—are transcended” (Religion and Nothingness, p. 61).
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nihility . . .  is a nothingness represented from the side of being, a 
nothingness set in opposition to being, a relative nothingness. And 
this brings us to the necessity of having nihility go a step further and 
convert to SUnyata. The emptiness of gilnyata is not an emptiness 
represented as some ‘thing’ outside of being and other than being. It 
is not simply an “ empty nothing,”  but rather an absolute nothing- 
ness, emptied even of these representations of emptiness. And for 
that reason, it is at bottom one with being, even as being is at bottom 
one with emptiness, (p. 123)
Thus Nishitani is using the term “ absolute nothingness”  in contrast to a mis­
taken and overly negative “ nothingness.”  “ Emptiness”  is not merely negative 
nothingness, but implies going beyond the nothingness that is the opposite of 
“ being.”  In another passage Nishitani says:
Buddhism goes further to speak of “ the emptiness of the nihilizing 
view,”  by which it means to stress that “ absolute emptiness”  in 
which nihilizing emptiness would itself be emptied. In this absolute 
emptiness, the field of consciousness that looks upon the self and 
things as merely internal or external realities, and the nihility set up 
at the ground of this field, can for the first time be overstepped. 
(P. 34)
Again,
to speak of nothingness as standing “ behind” person does not imply 
a duality between nothingness and person. In describing this nothing­
ness as “ something”  wholly other, we do not mean that there is 
actually some “ thing” that is wholly other. Rather, true nothingness 
means that there is no thing that is nothingness, and this is absolute 
nothingness. “ Nothingness” is generally forced into a relationship 
with “ being” and made to serve as its negation, leading to its concep­
tion as something that “ is” nothingness because it “ is not”  being, 
(p. 70)
This last passage is reminiscent of Chih-i’s handling of “ nothingness” (wu) 
and “ being” (yu ), except that Chih-i opted to describe “ true nothingness”  in 
terms of emptiness, the conventional, and the middle instead of “ absolute 
nothingness.”  Both are concerned to point out that Buddhist nothingness/ 
emptiness is not merely a denial of being. Further, Nishitani does not ignore the 
importance of what Chih-i calls the “ conventional,” and the acting out on the 
phenomenological level. “ Emptiness”  is not negative, and Nishitani asserts 
that “ the field of Sflnyatfl is nothing other than the field of the Great Affirma-
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tion” (p. 131). And in a passage emphasizing the necessity o f action in the 
world and the “manifestation” o f absolute nothingness, Nishitani specifically 
makes a small bow in the direction o f the T’ien-t’ai/Tendai formulation:
The shift of man as person from person-centered self-prehension to 
self-revelation as the manifestation o f absolute nothingness requires 
an existential conversion, a change o f heart within man himself. . . . 
In this kind o f existential conversion, the self does not cease being a 
personal being. What is left behind is only the person-centered mode 
o f grasping person t that is, the mode o f being wherein the person is 
caught up in itself. In that very conversion the personal mode of 
being becomes more real, draws closer to the self, and appears in its 
true suchness. . . .  In this sense we can understand person as per­
sona—the “ face” that an actor puts on to indicate the role he is to play 
on stage—but only as the persona o f absolute nothingness. . . . But 
at the same time it is in the most elemental sense an “ illusion” pre­
cisely because it is the highest mode o f being, constituted in unison 
with absolute nothingness and becoming manifest as such. Man thus 
comes into being as an absolute nothingness-sive-being rooted 
elementally in the personal mode o f being. In the terms o f the Tendai 
school o f Buddhism, man comes into being as the “ middle” between 
“ illusion” and “ emptiness.”  (p. 70)
This is explained further in a later passage:
Therefore, the elemental mode o f being, as such, is illusory 
appearance. And things themselves, as such, are phenomena. Conse­
quently, when we speak o f illusory appearance, we do not mean that 
there are real beings in addition that merely happen to adopt illusory 
guises to appear in. Precisely because it is appearance, and not some- 
thing that appears, this appearance is illusory at the elemental level 
in its very reality, and real in its very illusoriness. In my view, we can 
use the term the ancients used, “ the middle,” to denote this, since it 
is a term that seems to bring out the distinctive feature o f the mode 
o f  being o f things in themselves, (p. 129)
The “ ancients” here refer not only to T’ien-t’ai but also to Madhyimika 
thought and even classical Mahayana Buddhist thought in general. The nega­
tive imptications o f emptiness are thus tempered by realizing the “reality” of 
the conventional appearance o f phenomena “ as-they-are.”  This is clear in a 
later passage:
When we say that our self in itself is most elementally “middle,”
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we are not thinking in terms of the “ middle” that Aristotle, for 
instance, spoke of as the “ mean” between too much and too little. 
Nor are we thinking of the role of go-between that Hegel attributed 
to reason as a “ mediation” between contradictories. Whereas these 
are both “ middles” projected on the field of reason, the “ middle” 
seen as a mode of being on the field of emptiness cannot be projected 
on any other field whatsoever. It is immediately present—and imme­
diately realized as such—at the point that we ourselves actually are. 
It is “ at hand” for us and “ underfoot.”  Just as no one else can see 
for us or hear for us, so too none of our actions can be performed by 
proxy. All actions imply, as it were, an absolute immediacy. And it is 
there that what we are calling the “ middle” appears, (p. 166)
From the perspective of the classic T’ien-t’ai Buddhist formulation, then, 
Nishitani’s philosophical standpoint comes across as very “ orthodox”  and 
quite in line with the threefold truth pattern. This came as somewhat of a sur­
prise to me, for I began research on this topic with the expectation of writing a 
critique of Nishitani’s Buddhism as falling short of the classic Buddhist formu­
lations. Nishitani, however, fully in line with classic Mahayana thought, 
agrees that whether expressed as “ absolute nothingness”  or “ middle,” the 
point is to go beyond the extremes of nihility and substantive Being, and to 
find significance in positive action in and through the conventional world that 
involves both wisdom and compassion. The main difference between Nishitani 
and the classic threefold truth formulation (at least on this point), is a ques­
tion of terminology, with Nishitani using terms such as “ absolute nothing­
ness.”
The only question, then, is, why “ absolute nothingness” ? Why does the 
Kyoto School emphasize the use of strongly negative terminology such as “ ab­
solute nothingness” instead of being satisfied or more strongly asserting and 
reassessing positive classical Buddhist expressions such as “ emptiness,”  the 
“ middle,”  “ becoming manifest,”  “ absolute affirmation,” and so forth? Is it 
due to their attempt to deal with the problem of nihilism? Are they concerned 
to develop a new vocabulary beyond traditional Buddhist rhetoric in their at­
tempt to deal with Western philosophy? I suspect that in fact the culprit is the 
Ch’an/Zen tradition, which reverted to a habitual use of ww/znu/nothingness 
rhetoric despite the transcendence of the wu-yu (being-nothingness) cul-de-sac 
achieved by Chih-i through the threefold truth formulation? At least in the 
case of Nishitani, the Kyoto School philosophers have appropriated the Zen
7 The popularity of the “ FFu/mu Koan” (“ Does a dog have Buddha nature?” ) is 
only the most obvious example.
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mu/nothingness rhetoric but have tried to go beyond it and provide for 
affirmation of the conventional world, and compassionate action therein, by 
introducing the term “ absolute nothingness.**
The influence of Zen thought and practice on Nishida KitarO and other 
members of the Kyoto School, including Nishitani, is well known. Nishitani 
himself, though he remained content to call himself a “ Buddhist in the mak­
ing,** had completed the full course of Zen training. However, it is to 
Nishitani’s credit that he “ re-converts”  to more positive expressions such as 
emptiness, middle, and even “ absolute affirmation”  rather than limiting him­
self to the (still negative) terminology of (absolute) nothingness. In this sense 
we could say that he is more “ fully** Buddhist than the surface meaning of the 
mu rhetoric in the Zen tradition.
In sum, the key to evaluating (religiously, if not philosophically) the success 
of Nishitani’s (and the Kyoto School’s) rhetoric of absolute nothingness in 
terms of classical Buddhist thought is to query whether it allows sufficiently 
for positive manifestation, for the affirmation of the conventional, and (ulti­
mately) for the actual living out of compassion. One could go further and 
hope not only for it to “ allow”  but to “ encourage,” “ inspire** or even “ neces­
sitate”  positive expression. Nishitani calls for “ an existential conversion,”  (p. 
70), “ becoming manifest”  (p. 71), “ showing Great Compassion** (p. 75), and 
“ taking up the struggle”  (against nihilism).” 8 If the rhetoric of philosophical 
nothingness inspires positive expression through compassionate action in the 
conventional world, then “ absolute nothingness** is not merely negative but, 
like the classic Mahayana ideal, a middle way that incorporates both empti­
ness and conventionality.
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